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Whistleblowing and Caterpillar Inc.’s 
Swiss Tax Strategy
Amy Lysak, Richard Marmon, and Edward J. Schoen
Rohrer College of Business, Rowan University, USA
Abstract. This case describes the background of the whistleblower complaint, filed by Daniel
Schlicksup, questioning the propriety of Caterpillar Inc.’s “Swiss tax strategy”. The Swiss tax
strategy was recommended by its independent auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), and
designed to transfer to a Swiss entity the profits earned on its sales of “purchased finished
replacement parts” to foreign marketers. This strategy enabled Caterpillar to shift $8 billion in
replacement parts sales to Switzerland and to avoid or defer paying U.S. taxes on that income.
Daniel Schlicksup, a member of Caterpillar’s tax staff, filed an Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
whistleblower complaint against Caterpillar and provided the IRS extensive documentation that
served as the foundation for the IRS’s claim Caterpillar owed $2 billion in back taxes and penalties,
potentially entitling Schlicksup to a huge whistleblower award ranging from $300 to $600 million.
Careful review of this case facilitates student discussion, and enhances student understanding, of the
wisdom and morality of Schlicksup’s whistleblowing activities.  
Keywords: auditor independence, annual financial reports, back taxes and penalties, economic 
substance, external whistleblowing, federal income tax avoidance, Internal Revenue Service, 
internal whistleblowing, offshore profits, taxation, whistleblower retaliation, protection, 
whistleblower rewards.
1.   Introduction
On April 1, 2014, the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations released its majority staff report accusing Caterpillar Inc., an iconic
U.S. manufacturing company producing power generators, construction
equipment, and sophisticated engines, of implementing a tax strategy which,
between 2000 and 2012, shifted approximately $8 billion in replacement part
sales (approximately 85% or more of its profits) to Switzerland and thereby
avoided paying $2.4 billion in taxes to the United States (Subcommittee on
Investigations Report 2014, p. 1; Douglas 2014).  These sales were taxed in
Switzerland at a negotiated corporate tax rate of 5% to 6%, which enabled
Caterpillar to achieve the lowest effective tax rate among companies listed in the
Dow 30, an index containing the most popular and widely held stocks in the
world, which are generally considered some of the most solid “blue chip” stocks
on the market (Subcommittee on Investigations Report 2014, p. 41, 46;
Dividend.com).
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The person who triggered the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation’s
interest in Caterpillar was Daniel Schlicksup, a tax accountant who had worked
for Caterpillar for 16 years and who continually reported to his superiors his
concerns that the Swiss tax strategy was illegal (Gruley et al. 2017).  Schlicksup
grew up close to Peoria, Illinois, one of eight siblings whose family had deep ties
to the area. He received his finance and law degrees from Northern Illinois
University, and went on to earn a Master of Laws from Chicago-Kent College of
Law. He worked for several years for Arthur Andersen & Co. in Chicago, and
moved back to Peoria, where he joined PwC to work on the Caterpillar account.
Caterpillar then hired him as part of its tax staff.  That experience would prove
invaluable to Schlicksup, because it provided him the opportunity to gather
documentation on the Swiss tax strategy, which would form the basis of his
potentially lucrative IRS whistleblowing lawsuit and the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations’ report (Gruley et al. 2017).
2.   Implementation of Caterpillar’s Swiss Tax Strategy
Following the recommendations of its independent auditor, PwC, and law firm,
McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Caterpillar’s tax manager, Robin Beran,
implemented its Swiss tax strategy. In 1998, Caterpillar and PwC’s tax consulting
group agreed that PwC would undertake a comprehensive review of Caterpillar’s
tax practices at the state, national and international levels in order to identify
operational changes that might lower its overall tax payments. PwC was
Caterpillar’s longtime auditor, providing audit services since the 1920s.  In the
1990s, the audit firm extended its services to include tax consulting services to
assist with identifying strategies to reduce global taxes.1 PwC conducted that
review of Caterpillar’s existing tax practices and, starting in 1999, Caterpillar
began implementing PwC’s recommendations over the next four years as
approved by its executive steering committee (Subcommittee on Investigations
Report 2014, p. 42).  One of the key recommendations PwC made was to remove
Caterpillar from the chain of title for purchased finished replacement parts
(PFRP) supplied by U.S. or foreign parts manufacturers and sold to foreign
marketers, and to establish a Swiss entity as the direct purchaser of PFRP, thereby
attributing the income from those sales to foreign marketers to the Swiss entity
1. A majority of the tax services related to the Swiss tax strategy were provided to Caterpillar
prior to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX).  SOX resulted in stricter rules
surrounding the types of consulting and tax services that can be provided by an audit firm to
its client.  Prior to SOX, there were few restrictions on providing both auditing and tax
consulting services simultaneously to a client. After SOX was enacted, any tax services
performed by the auditor required pre-approval from its client’s audit committee.  The
PCAOB’s Rule 3522 specifically states that an audit firm would not be independent of its client
if it provides services related to marketing, planning or opining in favor of a tax treatment
involving an “aggressive tax position” transaction (Subcommittee on Investigations Report
2014, p. 45).
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and enabling Caterpillar to defer paying U.S. taxes on that income by keeping it
offshore2 (Subcommittee on Investigations Report 2014, p. 43).
Prior to the implementation of its Swiss tax strategy, Caterpillar purchased its
replacement parts from third party manufacturers, many of whom were located in
the U.S. in close proximity to Caterpillar, and then sold the parts to its foreign
marketers, which in turn sold them to Caterpillar’s independent dealers.  Profits
from those sales were included in Caterpillar’s income and were taxable in the
U.S. (Subcommittee on Investigations Report 2014, p. 47).  Likewise, profits
earned by Caterpillar’s foreign marketers were also taxable in the U.S. as foreign
base company sales income under Subpart F3 whether it was repatriated to the
U.S. or not (Subcommittee on Investigations Report 2014, p. 13).  More
particularly, if Caterpillar’s foreign marketers, which sit in a tax haven, purchase
the replacement parts from Caterpillar and then sell the goods in a third
jurisdiction and retain the income resulting from the transaction, that income is
nonetheless attributable to Caterpillar’s U.S. operations under Subpart F
(Subcommittee on Investigations Report 2014, pp. 13-14).
To implement the tax strategy, Caterpillar consolidated its leading Swiss
affiliate, Caterpillar Overseas, S.A. (COSA), which acted as Caterpillar’s lead
marketing company for the Europe, Africa and Middle East (EAME) region, and
several of its other Swiss affiliates, into a renamed Swiss entity, Caterpillar SARL
(CSARL).  CSARL is treated as a limited liability corporation for Swiss tax
purposes, but as a limited liability partnership for U.S. tax purposes
(Subcommittee on Investigations Report 2014; pp. 37-38, 48).  CSARL created a
new position for a Switzerland-based “Worldwide Parts Manager” that was
charged with establishing an overall parts strategy in consultation with
Caterpillar’s Executive Office and acting as a liaison among Caterpillar’s
business units involved with parts management (Subcommittee on Investigations
Report 2014, p. 39-40).  While CSARL continues to perform the same marketing
functions as COSA, including supporting Caterpillar’s non-U.S. dealer network
with respect to parts in the EAME region, CSARL was designated Caterpillar’s
“global purchaser” of PFRP.  Through a series of licensing agreements,
Caterpillar’s highly profitable replacement part sales business was effectively
transferred to CSARL for which they agreed to pay either a 4%or 6% royalty to
Caterpillar.  CSARL also agreed to pay Caterpillar’s costs plus a 5% markup for
2. Notably, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (TCJA) made sweeping changes to the
international tax rules by shifting the U.S. tax system to a more territorial structure in an effort
to align it with most other industrialized nations, whereby countries impose taxes only on
income earned within their borders without regard to a taxpayer’s residence status. Some of
the provisions that have mitigated the advantages of Caterpillar’s Swiss tax strategy include
lower overall corporate rates, the mandatory transition tax on accumulated foreign earnings,
the newly enacted participation exemption deduction and changes made to the foreign tax
credit among others.
3. Subpart F was enacted in 1962 to deter U.S. taxpayers from using controlled foreign
subsidiaries located in tax havens to accumulate earnings that should have been accumulated
and taxed in the U.S.
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maintaining the core functions of Caterpillar’s worldwide replacement part
operations, including managing the worldwide parts inventory, supervising
suppliers, storing CSARL-owned parts in the U.S., supervising parts logistics,
and forecasting parts demand, all of which CSARL was unable to perform
(Subcommittee on Investigations Report 2014, pp. 38-39, 52-54).  In addition,
CSARL entered into “tolling agreements” with Caterpillar’s principal European
manufacturers in France and Belgium.  These agreements shifted approximately
7% of French and Belgian affiliates’ profits to Switzerland through a cost plus
arrangement (Subcommittee on Investigations Report 2014, p. 51).  The bottom
line from these agreements was that Caterpillar was able to allocate 85% or more
of the non-U.S. replacement parts profits to CSARL, instead of the 15% or less
previously allocated to CSARL’s predecessor, COSA (Subcommittee on
Investigations Report 2014, p. 52).
Even though a substantial amount of replacement parts sales was transferred
to CSARL, the number of employees working for CSARL was modest.  As of
2012, Caterpillar indicated there were 8,300 employees worldwide associated to
its overall “purchase, storage, movement, and sales of replacement parts.”  Of the
8,300 employees, 66 were located in Switzerland.  Of the 66 Swiss employees,
only 10 were involved with “parts pricing” and 56 employees worked for its
EAME division (Subcommittee on Investigations Report 2014, p. 40).
Over the next thirteen years, the Swiss tax strategy permitted Caterpillar to
shift billions in sales outside the United States and defer or avoid paying billions
in federal income taxes (Subcommittee on Investigations Report 2014, p. 2;
Gruley et al. 2017).  These tax savings dwarfed the $55 million fee Caterpillar
paid PwC to develop and implement the tax strategy (Subcommittee on
Investigations Report 2014; p. 2, 4, 6, 46).
3.   Caterpillar’s Swiss Tax Strategy and Genuine Economic Substance
Taxpayers are permitted to structure their business transactions to reduce or avoid
taxation; however, those efforts will be unsuccessful if the transactions lack
“economic substance.”  This requirement stems from the United States Supreme
Court decision in Gregory v. Helvering,4 in which a woman who owned one
company, transferred its stock to a newly created, second company, and received
in return shares in the second company.  Three days later she dissolved the second
company, took back the shares in the first company and sold them.  She claimed
her tax-free corporate reorganizations increased the cost of the first company
shares thereby reducing her taxable gain.  The Supreme Court decided that her
transactions lacked any economic substance other than tax avoidance and ruled in
favor of the IRS.5  In 2010, the economic substance doctrine was codified in 26
4. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
5. Ibid.
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U.S.C. § 7701(o), which establishes a two-part test to determine whether a
transaction has economic substance: (1) the transaction must alter the taxpayers’
economic position in a meaningful way, and (2) the transaction must have a
substantial non-tax purpose.    
Although Caterpillar’s Swiss tax strategy changed their economic position in
a meaningful way, whether there was a substantial non-tax purpose in
implementing that strategy requires the consideration of  several issues: (1)
whether the terms of the transfer pricing agreements between Caterpillar and
CSARL are the equivalent to terms parties would agree to in an arms-length
transaction, (2) whether Caterpillar received sufficient compensation for its
transfer of its replacement parts business to CSARL and replaced an 85/15%
profit split with a 15/85% profit split on sales of non-U.S. parts, (3) whether
severing the high-profit-margin replacement parts business from the low-profit-
margin sales of Caterpillar equipment is an equitable distribution of profits, (4)
whether Caterpillar is adequately compensated for continuing to perform key
functions (parts design, parts forecasting, inventory management, supplier
oversight, quality control, and parts pricing, storage and delivery) supporting the
replacement parts sales business, and (5) whether the virtual inventory system
establishes CSARL partnership activity on U.S. soil, triggering taxation of
replacement part sales profits in the U.S. (Subcommittee on Investigations Report
2014, pp. 80-86).  
According to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, the quick
answers to these questions are as follows: (1) it is highly doubtful parties in an
arms-length transaction would transfer a highly profitable replacement parts
business producing 85% of its profits without receiving some compensation for
the decades Caterpillar devoted to developing its replacement part business; (2)
Caterpillar received no compensation for its dramatic and lopsided switch in the
profit split between Caterpillar and CSARL and no compensation for the millions
of Caterpillar machines in the field that continually need replacement parts; (3)
Caterpillar received no compensation for severing the highly profitable
replacement parts business that produced a years-long income stream from the
machine sales business and transferring it to CSARL while remaining responsible
for the design, manufacture and sales of Caterpillar machines; (4) the cost plus a
5% markup produced only limited income to Caterpillar in return for its
obligation to maintain normal operations in support of the parts sales business and
to bear the ultimate economic risk for the replacement parts business; and (5) the
virtual inventory system permits the commingling of parts without any regard to
ownership, accommodates flash titling, and allows intercompany borrowing and
assigning of parts ownership after sales are made, and demonstrates that
Caterpillar and CSARL have a common inventory pool managed by both parties
for their mutual benefit, suggesting the existence of a de facto U.S. partnership
between Caterpillar and CSARL (Subcommittee on Investigations Report 2014;
p. 2, 4, 6, 46).  
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4.   Schlicksup’s Early Career with Caterpillar
Shortly after joining Caterpillar’s tax department, Schlicksup was assigned to
Brussels and Geneva from 1996 to 2005 to give him greater exposure to
international tax law and to establish its first overseas tax department.  In 2005,
Schlicksup returned to the United States to take the position of global tax strategy
manager and was charged with assisting tax risk management and improving the
company’s global tax practices (Subcommittee on Investigations Report 2014, p.
64).  He lived with his wife and two sons in a three-bedroom home on 17 wooded
acres in Dunlap, near Peoria.  He reported to Beran, who in turn reported to the
then CFO, David Burritt, and developed a reputation for competently handling
complex projects with aplomb and earned strong and complimentary job
performance reviews.  He also displayed a somewhat prickly personality, sending
detailed, badgering e-mails to colleagues complaining about a variety of
accounting and earnings issues both before and after meetings (Gruley et al.
2017).
Shortly after his appointment to his new position, Schlicksup developed a
“Tax Risk Guard Rails” (TRGR) risk management tool to evaluate Caterpillar’s
tax position. TRGR assessed a variety of factors: technical, operational,
compliance, financial statement, management, and reputational.  These factors, in
turn, were broken down into 19 “indicative criteria,” such as industry practice,
magnitude of cash impact, legal advice, and impact on financial statements.  Each
of the 19 criteria was scored using a rating system of 1 to 5, with 5 being the
highest risk (Subcommittee on Investigations Report 2014, pp. 64-65).  Once
specific tax positions were evaluated and scored, they were plotted on a graph
showing whether the risk was high, medium or low, and presented to company
executives (Subcommittee on Investigations Report 2014, p. 65).  In 2006, when
TRGR was applied to the Swiss tax strategy, two areas were singled out as
possessing high risk: the bundled royalty rate CSARL paid to Caterpillar and the
virtual inventory system which transposed Caterpillar’s parts sales into CSARL’s
parts sales (Subcommittee on Investigations Report 2014, p. 66).  Caterpillar
continued to employ the TRGR tax position rating system through 2008 and
reviewed the risk ratings twice each year.  The risk assigned to the Swiss tax
strategy remained high throughout those years (Subcommittee on Investigations
Report 2014, p. 68).  That Caterpillar recognized the high risk of its Swiss tax
strategy is also confirmed by its setting aside a substantial “tax reserve” equal to
half of CSARL’s profits should the IRS challenge the Swiss tax strategy.6
6. GAAP requires companies to account for and disclose uncertain tax positions.  An uncertain
tax positions is a tax position taken by a company that may or may not be sustainable upon
reviewed by a taxing authority.  The accounting standards require that any positions that are
not “more-likely-than-not” defendable against federal, state or local tax review be estimated
and accounted for as a liability in the financial statements.
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5.   Schlicksup’s Internal Complaints about the Swiss Tax Strategy
In 2006, Beran assigned Schlicksup to work with companies lobbying Congress
about the “economic substance” requirement.  His research convinced him that
Caterpillar and CSARL’s agreement violated the requirement. Although
Schlicksup was not involved in setting up the Swiss tax strategy, he made his
misgivings about the strategy known to Beran, Burritt and other Caterpillar
executives in a series of e-mail messages.  Beran and Burritt asked Schlicksup not
to debate the economic substance issue via e-mail and informed him no change
would be made to the CSARL arrangement.  Changes began to appear, however,
in Schlicksup’s performance evaluation which contained negative comments on
his 2007 review, causing Schlicksup to fear losing his job (Gruley et al. 2017).
During the Spring 2008 meeting of Caterpillar finance executives at the
Peoria Civic Center, a few blocks from Caterpillar’s headquarters, Eugene Fife,
the chair of the audit committee, reminded those present that they were the
stewards of Caterpillar’s reputation, noted that the actions of only one or two
“wayward stewards” could bring disaster to a company as colossal as Caterpillar,
and urged anyone aware of financial misstatements to report them immediately.
CEO Jim Owens underscored Fife’s comments by stating he “slept well,” because
it was unimaginable to him that the financial improprieties discovered in the
Enron scandal could occur at Caterpillar.  These comments caused Schlicksup to
believe his “economic substance” warnings had not been passed on to the CEO.
Schlicksup returned to his office and sent an e-mail to two group presidents (with
the subject line “Ethics issues important to you, the Board and Cat Shareholders”)
in which he referred to his misgivings about the tax strategy, described the
methodical campaign to mute his concerns, and complained he was the victim of
retaliation by his superiors.  The next morning, Schlicksup sent 137 pages of
additional documents to the two group presidents explaining how Caterpillar and
PwC shifted billions in sales to Switzerland to avoid paying U.S. taxes (Gruley et
al. 2017).
6.   Schlicksup Blows the Whistle
While Schlicksup’s e-mail failed to change Caterpillar’s tax strategy, it torpedoed
his career. Four months later, John Heller, Caterpillar’s Chief Information Office,
and Alice Barbour, a human resources manager, advised Schlicksup that his
position had been eliminated, and he would be transferred to the information
technology division.  When his objections to the transfer failed, Schlicksup
reluctantly accepted the new position (and the 7% increase in salary that came
with it).  Four months later he filed an IRS whistleblower complaint accusing
Caterpillar of tax fraud, and in June 2009, he filed a retaliation lawsuit in federal
district court in Peoria against Caterpillar.  Schlicksup remained at Caterpillar as
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he pursued his retaliation claim, taking unpaid leave for depositions, becoming
increasingly miserable as his professional career crumbled, and receiving
treatment for stress from three physicians and a physical therapist.  Schlicksup’s
retaliation claim survived Caterpillar’s first motion to dismiss, and, while the
second motion to dismiss was pending, he and Caterpillar reached a settlement,
the terms of which were not disclosed (Gruley et al. 2017).
Schlicksup continued to work with the IRS on his whistleblower claim.
Armed with extensive documentation provided by Schlicksup, the IRS in
December 2013 accused Caterpillar of concocting an abusive tax strategy and
understating its U.S. income by more than $3 billion during the period 2007
through 2009 (Gruley et al. 2017).  Hearings by the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations followed. In a 2011 deposition, Schlicksup defended his
whistleblowing activity by claiming that “[i]t is absolutely in the shareholder’s
best interests to have the most accurate financial statements they can have,” and,
echoing CEO Jim Owens, said “I don’t think that the shareholders of Enron would
think it would have been such a bad deal if somebody would have caught that
before it bankrupted the company and they lost everything they had” (Gruley et
al. 2017).
7.   Retaliation Protection of IRS Whistleblowers
In 2006, when Congress overhauled the IRS whistleblower program, the U.S.
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration recommended that Congress
include anti-retaliation protection for IRS whistleblowers, but Congress declined
to do so.  Hence the IRS whistleblowing program provides little retaliation
protection to IRS whistleblowers other than a weak commitment by the IRS to
keep the identity of the whistleblower confidential. The only way IRS
whistleblowers can get protection against retaliation is to combine their IRS
whistleblowing complaint with another whistleblowing program that provides
protection against whistleblowing, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1514A, The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), or the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3).  Hence IRS whistleblowers can be protected when
there is an overlap between the IRS whistleblower disclosure and, for example,
misstated financial records or shortcomings in internal controls (Sarbanes-
Oxley), or health care fraud or medical kickbacks for Medicare or Medicaid
referrals (False Claims Act), or failure to pay workers for compensable commute
time (Fair Labor Standards Act) (Law360 2012).  
The many federal whistleblowing regulations mentioned above that protect
whistleblowers from retaliation strongly advocate on behalf of the duty owed to
society and the potential harm that would be caused by allowing financial
improprieties to go unchallenged. Those regulations advocate in favor of
protecting the whistleblower over the economic harm that may be suffered by a
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company over a species claim, especially in a situation such as Caterpillar, where
the financial burden of a significant tax obligation maybe ultimately borne by the
society as a whole.  That the IRS’s whistleblowing regulations do not otherwise
provide for similar protections may be perceived to add a level of credibility to
claims made under their disclosure program.
Because it does not appear that Schlicksup combined his IRS whistleblower
claim with another whistleblower program that provides whistleblower
protection, for instance disclosure to the company’s audit committee of the board
of directors under the procedures authorized by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
Schlicksup lacked protection against retaliation.  Nonetheless, perhaps seeking to
avoid a charge of retaliation, Caterpillar did not terminate Schlicksup’s
employment, but rather transferred him to the information technology division
with a 7% salary increase.  
8.   Schlicksup’s Potential Whistleblower Award
The Internal Revenue Service provides two levels of whistleblower awards based
on the amount of taxes, penalties, interest and any additions to tax collected from
the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s gross income.  For tax deficiencies less than $2
million or in cases where the gross income of the taxpayers does not exceed
$200,000, the maximum award is 15% of the amount collected up to a maximum
of $10 million.  Under IRC §7623, tax deficiencies and gross income exceeding
these amounts require the IRS to pay 15% to 30% of the amount collected
(Whistleblower – Informant Award 2017).  In the event the IRS is successful in
assessing and collecting $2 billion in taxes from Caterpillar, Schlicksup may be
entitled to receive up to $600 million under the whistleblowing statute depending
upon how valuable the IRS views Schlicksup’s contribution to the IRS’s claim
against Caterpillar.  Based on the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations’
Report, that contribution was significant.  Schlicksup’s name frequently appears
in the Subcommittee’s report in various capacities: his interviews with the
Subcommittee; his role as an employee of Caterpillar; his repeated warnings
about the economic substance of the Swiss tax strategy; numerous depositions
taken during his litigation against Caterpillar; and multiple e-mail messages sent
to and from Schlicksup assembled in the record.  Indeed, Schlicksup’s
whistleblowing award might grow larger, as additional tax years during which
Caterpillar employed the Swiss tax strategy are added to the IRS’s audit of
Caterpillar.
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9.   Caterpillar’s 2017 Annual Report Disclosure
In its 2017 annual report Caterpillar, filed with the SEC,7 made the following
disclosure about the status of the IRS proposal to attribute the replacement part
business profits earned by CSARL to Caterpillar and to tax those profits in U.S.:
For tax years 2007 to 2012 including the impact of a loss carryback to 2005, the
IRS has proposed to tax in the United States profits earned from certain parts
transactions by CSARL based on the IRS examination team’s application of
“substance-over-form” or “assignment-of-income” judicial doctrines. We are
vigorously contesting the proposed increases to tax and penalties for these years
of approximately $2.3 billion. We believe that the relevant transactions complied
with applicable tax laws and did not violate judicial doctrines.  The purchase of
parts by CSARL from unrelated parties and the subsequent sale of those parts to
unrelated dealers outside the United States have substantial legal, commercial,
and economic consequences for the parties involved.  We have filed U.S. income
tax returns on this same basis for years after 2012.  Therefore, we have concluded
that the largest amount of benefit that is more likely than not to be sustained
related to this position is the entire benefit. As a result, no amount related to these
IRS adjustments is reflected in unrecognized tax benefits. We have filed U.S.
income tax returns on this basis for years after 2012. We currently believe the
ultimate disposition of this matter will not have a material adverse effect on our
consolidated financial position, liquidity or results of operations (Caterpillar
Form 10-K 2017, pp. 59-60 of the Management’s Discussion and Analysis
(“MD&A”)).
10.   Caterpillar’s Defense of Its Swiss Tax Strategy
During the hearings before the Subcommittee on Investigations, several witnesses
testified in favor of Caterpillar’s contention that its agreement with CSARL
possessed economic substance and addressed a business purpose other than
reducing taxes.  New York University School of Law Professor John Steines
opined that the CSARL transaction complied with the economic substance test.
He claimed that removing Caterpillar as the “middleman” between supplier and
customer was a sensible business decision and was supported by case law.  “[I]t
was highly unlikely,” he stated, “that a court adjudicating with fidelity to the law
presented in [his] report would find that the restructuring or the countless ensuing
7. In addition to the reporting requirements mandated by the SEC for US public registrants, on a
periodic basis, correspondence between the SEC and regulated companies occur whereby the
SEC provides a letter to management detailing questions regarding disclosures and accounting
issues.  During the periods affected by Caterpillar’s Swiss Tax Strategy, the SEC had provided
management comments specific to the tax accounting disclosures and accruals related to
Caterpillar’s offshore investments and operations and included questions regarding various tax
disclosures for CSARL all of which were sufficiently resolved by Caterpillar’s management
without adjustment to the financial statements.
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outbound PFRP transaction offend the doctrines or substance over form or
economic substance” (Subcommittee on Investigations Report 2014; p. 79, 154).  
Thomas F. Quinn, the PwC Tax Consulting Partner who originally proposed
the Swiss tax strategy, testified that Caterpillar’s assigning the PFRP sales
operations to CSARL was part of Caterpillar’s global reorganization and simply
did for part sales what Caterpillar previously did for equipment, namely to
delegate responsibility for sales outside the U.S. to a company outside the U.S.
The agreement, Quinn insisted, has tangible economic benefit, because CSARL
became a “risk-bearing entrepreneurial company [whose] margins increased
consistent with the increase of functions and risks (Subcommittee on
Investigations Report Hearing Transcript 2014, p. 124). As a result of the
reorganization, CSARL purchased finished parts directly from third-party
suppliers and sold them to third-party dealers, and the profits earned on those
sales is foreign based income, the tax on which is deferred until the income is
remitted to Caterpillar in the U.S. (Subcommittee on Investigations Report
Hearing Transcript 2014, p. 124).  Quinn also noted that PwC annually tested the
arrangements between Caterpillar and CSARL to confirm that they conformed to
the IRS transfer pricing rules under the relevant transfer pricing methods
prescribed by the Treasury regulations, and that their analysis confirmed the
arrangement complied with the arm’s-length requirements of related-party
pricing (Subcommittee on Investigations Report Hearing Transcript 2014; pp. 28-
29, 125-126).  
Julie A. Lagacy, Vice President of Finance Services for Caterpillar, testified
that “Caterpillar has fully complied with U.S. tax law.”  She explained that
Caterpillar assigned the PFRP operation to CSARL in order to remain
competitive and increase exports, and to remove Caterpillar as an unnecessary
middleman which bought parts from independent suppliers and then sold them to
dealers outside the United States. “The removal of Caterpillar from the
transactional flow has resulted in a simpler supply chain that better reflects the
reality that CSARL is a true entrepreneur for sales of machines, engines, and parts
in its territories” (Subcommittee on Investigations Report Hearing Transcript
2014; pp. 59-60, 131, 133).  When it planned and implemented the restructuring,
she noted, Caterpillar relied on the advice of PwC and its law firm.  CSARL, she
claimed, paid Caterpillar an arms-length royalty for the intangible property made
available to CSARL by Caterpillar and an arms-length service fee for
Caterpillar’s activities to support the part sales activities (Subcommittee on
Investigations Report Hearing Transcript 2014; p. 60, 136, 138).  
11.   Conclusion
This case describes Caterpillar Inc.’s “Swiss tax strategy”, which was
recommended by its independent auditor, PwC, and designed to transfer the
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profits earned on its sales of purchased finished replacement parts to foreign
marketers to a Swiss entity. This strategy enabled Caterpillar to shift $8 billion in
replacement parts sales and approximately 85% or more of its profits to
Switzerland and to avoid or defer paying U.S. taxes on that income by keeping it
offshore. Daniel Schlicksup, a member of Caterpillar’s tax staff, persistently
complained the Swiss tax strategy failed to meet the “economic substance” test
and was illegal.  According to Schlicksup’s testimony, his complaints resulted in
negative performance reviews and his ultimate transfer to the corporation’s
information technology division.  It was at this point that Schlicksup felt a moral
obligation to report his findings to the IRS notwithstanding the potential impact
it might have had on his career. Schlicksup ultimately filed employment
retaliation and IRS whistleblower complaints against Caterpillar and began to
provide the IRS and the Subcommittee on Investigations with extensive
documentation which provided the foundation for the IRS’s claim Caterpillar
owed $2 billion in back taxes and penalties and the Subcommittee on
Investigations’ report accusing Caterpillar of tax fraud.  If Caterpillar is ultimately
required to pay the estimated $2 billion assessed by the IRS, Schlicksup may be
entitled to a huge whistleblower award ranging from $300 to $600 million.  This
case facilitates student discussion and enhances student understanding of the
wisdom and morality of Schlicksup’s whistleblowing activities. It is intended to
provide a framework for students to evaluate the available facts and explore
arguments either for or against the whistleblower’s claims.
Discussion Questions
1. Are you satisfied that the justifications Daniel Schlicksup provided in
his deposition testimony for blowing the whistle on Caterpillar’s
Swiss tax strategy are sufficient and convincing?  
2. Decide whether Caterpillar’s Swiss tax strategy possesses genuine
“economic substance.”  Briefly explain your decision. 
3. Briefly describe the generally accepted preconditions to engagement
in internal and external whistleblowing. 
4. Explain whether or not the generally accepted preconditions to
internal and external whistleblowing were properly fulfilled before
Daniel Schlicksup engaged in whistleblowing, thereby making his
whistleblowing actions morally permissible and morally obligatory.
5. Assess the morality of Daniel Schlicksup’s internal whistleblowing
activities under Act Utilitarianism, Rule Utilitarianism. Kant’s
Categorical Imperatives and Rawls’ Veil of Ignorance Theory? 
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6. Assess the morality of Daniel Schlicksup’s external whistleblowing
activities with the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and the
IRS under Act Utilitarianism, Rule Utilitarianism, Kant’s Categorical
Imperatives and Rawls’ Veil of Ignorance Theory? 
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